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Below I’ve quoted or summarized some ideas developed by Mortimer Adler in his book, The Difference of Man and the Difference it Makes. His thesis: (1) Conceptual thought is an immaterial power and, therefore, the brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition of conceptual thought. (2) If this is not the case, human beings are not radically different in kind from animals but only superficially different in kind based on underlying differences in degree (more powerful brains), and there is no basis to treat animals differently than humans or to object when more intelligent humans subjugate less intelligent humans.
My response to some comments during the discussion:
“[C]oncepts whereby we understand what different kinds or classes of things are like consist in meanings or intentions that are universal.” Id. 220 “[N]othing that exists physically is actually universal; anything that is embodied in matter exists as an individual.” Id. 220-221. “Hence [our concepts] do not exist physically; they are not embodied in matter.” Id. 222. “Since our concepts are acts of our power of conceptual thought, that power must itself be an immaterial power, one not embodied in a physical organ such as the brain.” Id. “The action of the brain . . . cannot be the sufficient condition of conceptual thought, though it may still be a necessary condition thereof.” Id.“Since, unlike concepts, perceptual abstractions do not have an intentionality that is universal in character, immateriality need not be attributed to the power of which they are acts.” Id. 225.
Two things are different in kind when one has a defining characteristic the other lacks. With a difference in kind, no intermediate object is possible with respect to the property in question (a trait of discontinuity). Two things are different in degree when they have common characteristics, but one has more than the other. With a difference in degree, an intermediate object is always possible (a trait of continuity). Id. 19-35.
A radical difference in kind is rooted in an underlying difference in kind involving a factor present in one but totally absent in the other (An example: odd numbers are not divisible by 2, but even numbers are). A superficial difference in kind is rooted in an underlying difference in degree involving a critical threshold that makes one thing have something another does not (An example: liquid, solid, and gas). Id. 23-27.
I pushed send before noting my comments:
1. Point by Mike that it is obvious human beings are different. Response: That may be, but the question is whether conceptual thought is an immaterial power and what difference that makes?
2. Question by Mike: Why assume there is no material basis for conceptual thought? Response: Adler doesn’t assume that and in fact assumes the opposite, that the brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for conceptual thought.
3. Comment by Jon that we don’t need a radical difference in kind. Response: Without that, what is the basis for treating animals differently or objecting to humans with superior intelligence subjugating those with inferior intelligence?
4. Comments from Carl, Steve, and another participant: Having conceptual thought is just the way we are. Response: I don’t think that addresses the issues Adler raises.John, is what Adler is saying simply amount to a rejection of materialism ie the view the only things which exist are material? If so, I think he is correct in saying that conceptual thought is nonmaterial just as other types of consciousness (eg perception) are non-material. The human brain as it has evolved is the material apparatus necessary for human consciousness (including conceptual thought) but that does not tell the whole story. Rand rejects materialism (and its opposite – idealism) holding that both the material and non-material (consciousness) exist and do not “war” against each other.
Steve: As I understand it, Adler believes that scientific observation to date of animals and other humans (through extrospection) requires us to conclude that non-linguistic animals engage only in perceptual thought, and humans engage in both perceptual thought and conceptual thought. Adler believes that perceptual thought is a material power (the brain is a necessary and sufficient condition for perceptual thought), but conceptual thought is an immaterial power (the brain is a necessary but insufficient condition for conceptual thought). He says that if we ever develop machines that can engage in conceptual thought (a Turing machine that can carry on a conversation in the same way humans do), that would mean conceptual thought is merely a material power. If that’s the case, we would be required to conclude that humans and non-linguistic animals are only superficially (not radically) different in kind. According to Adler, reaching that conclusion has serious implications. It undermines the basis for saying it is okay to treat animals differently than humans and not okay for more intelligent humans to treat less intelligent humans as their servants. Jack
Thanks for your very clear explanation of what Adler is saying. This seems to be connected to the Objectivist view that perception is automatic (determined by natural material processes) whereas conceptual thought requires the exercise of volition ie the choice to focus your mind. Then the question may be whether a machine could be created that could choose to think.
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